University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
College of Law, Faculty Publications

Law, College of

2009

A Decade of Change in Sixth Amendment Confrontation Doctrine
Roger Kirst
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, rkirst1@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub
Part of the Legal Studies Commons

Kirst, Roger, "A Decade of Change in Sixth Amendment Confrontation Doctrine" (2009). College of Law,
Faculty Publications. 3.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

International Commentary on
Evidence
Volume 6, Issue 2

2009

Article 5

E VIDENCE DURING THE T EN Y EARS OF ICE

A Decade of Change in Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Doctrine
Roger W. Kirst∗

∗

University of Nebraska College of Law, rkirst@unlserve.unl.edu

Copyright c 2009 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.

A Decade of Change in Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Doctrine∗
Roger W. Kirst

Abstract
The United States Supreme Court brought new prominence to Sixth Amendment confrontation doctrine in 2004 when it announced its testimonial interpretation in Crawford v. Washington.
This essay describes how confrontation doctrine was changed in the last decade by Crawford and
the Court’s subsequent decisions in Davis v. Washington and Giles v. California. It examines what
the disagreements among the five opinions in Giles suggest about whether the Court will continue
to rely so strongly on historical hearsay doctrine to interpret the Confrontation Clause. It discusses
other confrontation issues the Supreme Court will face in future cases.
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The most notable event for Sixth Amendment confrontation doctrine in the
last decade was the 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v.
Washington.1 Justice Scalia's majority opinion declared that the Court had strayed
from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause because the rationale in Ohio
v. Roberts2 allowed the prosecution to use all kinds of hearsay evidence upon a
judicial finding that it was reliable. Justice Scalia announced that the historical
evidence showed that the Clause was directed at excluding "testimonial" statements
of declarants who did not testify at trial.3 Under the Crawford interpretation,
testimonial statements could not be used by the prosecution unless the absent
declarant was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. Justice Scalia conceded that his Crawford opinion did not provide a
comprehensive definition of "testimonial" but he declared that interim uncertainty
until the Court could decide additional cases was better than the inherent
unpredictability produced by Roberts.4
The 7-2 vote in Crawford created the impression that Justice Scalia's
testimonial theory of confrontation had firmly set the Supreme Court on a new
course. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that it was not necessary to reject Roberts to
decide Crawford and that the new testimonial theory was not a clearly better reading
of the historical evidence than in prior opinions, but only Justice O'Connor joined his
concurring opinion.5
When the Court returned to confrontation doctrine two years later in Davis v.
Washington,6 neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor Justice O’Connor was serving on
the Court. Once again Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court; it provided
more detailed guidance on whether a victim's statement to law enforcement was
testimonial or nontestimonial. Justice Scalia had even stronger support in Davis from
an 8-1 vote; no other Justice joined Justice Thomas's opinion in which he argued that
the “testimonial” label should apply only to formalized statements to the police and
not to statements during informal police questioning.7
This year, Justice Scalia again announced the judgment of the Court when it
addressed forfeiture of confrontation rights by wrongdoing in Giles v. California.8
Justice Scalia concluded in his opinion that there was a founding-era forfeiture
exception to the right of confrontation, but that it applied "only when the defendant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
541 U.S. at 50-53.
Id. at 68 n. 10.
Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor, J., concurring).
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
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engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying."9 While the vote
to vacate the California judgment was 6-3, Justice Scalia did not have as much
support for his reasoning as he had in Crawford or Davis. Instead, the Justices
explained their views in five different opinions. Justice Scalia was fully supported by
only Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito joined Justice Scalia's
opinion, but each also wrote separately to argue for a narrower definition of a
testimonial statement that Justice Scalia did not accept.10 Justice Souter was joined
by Justice Ginsburg in an opinion that concurred with Justice Scalia in part; Justice
Souter declared that the historical evidence alone did not provide adequate detail to
answer the question raised by Giles and provided his own view on how the forfeiture
rule should work in practice.11 Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy; it rejected Justice Scalia's standard and sought
common ground with Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg on the operation of the
forfeiture rule.12
The last time the Justices wrote as many opinions in a confrontation case as
they did in Giles was in 1999 in Lilly v. Virginia.13 In retrospect, Lilly provided more
notice than was appreciated at the time that the Court was ready to reformulate
confrontation doctrine. While it was not possible to predict in 1999 whose view
would prevail, the opinions in Lilly sent a clear signal that some Justices had doubts
about the direction in which confrontation doctrine was then developing. Justice
Scalia's latest opinion in Giles continues to show his confident rejection of any
similar doubt about Crawford's testimonial interpretation, but the votes of the other
eight Justices may tell a different story. As a result, assessing the future direction of
confrontation doctrine requires attention to the views of individual Justices.
It may not take long to learn what the multiple opinions in Giles could mean
for the future direction of confrontation doctrine. The Supreme Court will hear
argument in November in Melendez-Diaz, a case from Massachusetts in which a
defendant objected on confrontation grounds to the State's use of a forensic
laboratory report in a drug prosecution without calling the analyst as a witness.14 The
defendant's objection was overruled in the trial court on the basis of Massachusetts
precedent that permitted the prosecution to use a drug analysis certificate as a
9

Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
11
Id. at 2694 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part).
12
Id. at 2695 (Breyer, Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
13
527 U.S. 116 (1999); id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id.
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
14
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct.) (unpublished opinion available
at 2007 WL 2189152); rev. denied, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007); cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (Mar.
17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
10

http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol6/iss2/art5
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business record of the laboratory.15 That precedent had been grounded in part on a
brief description in Crawford of business records as an example of a nontestimonial
statement.16
The opinions in Giles suggest that it is unlikely the Justices will consider the
brief mention of business records in Crawford as sufficient to resolve the issue in
Melendez-Diaz. There had been a similar brief endorsement of the forfeiture rule in
both Crawford17 and Davis,18 but none of the Justices in Giles thought they were
limited by what Crawford said about forfeiture. The opinions in Melendez-Diaz may
again present different readings of the historical record as well as a continuation of
the debate about whether the historical record alone can provide a sufficient
foundation for answering every confrontation question that may arise in modern
criminal prosecutions.
This Article will review the last ten years of confrontation doctrine and
consider what might lie ahead for some topics the Court has not yet addressed. Part I
will outline confrontation doctrine before it was revised by Crawford. Part II will
discuss the effect of Crawford and subsequent cases. Part III will examine the
questions that were raised by Giles in 2008. Part IV will describe the issues the
Court will face later this year in Melendez-Diaz. Part V will describe other important
topics the appellate courts have been addressing as they wait for further guidance
from the Supreme Court.
I. Confrontation Doctrine Before Crawford
The modern era of confrontation doctrine began in 1965 when the Supreme Court
held that the Confrontation Clause applied to state criminal trials.19 At the beginning
the Court found it sufficient to decide most confrontation cases on their facts without
adopting an overall theory of confrontation. Some early cases held that there was a
confrontation violation if the prosecution used a confession from an accomplice who
did not testify at trial,20 but no violation if the accomplice did testify.21 Other early
cases held that there was a confrontation violation if the prosecution used prior
testimony of a witness who did not appear at trial,22 but no violation if the witness

15

Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152 at *4, citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass.
2005).
16
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
17
Id. at 62.
18
547 U.S. at 833.
19
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
20
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
21
Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622.
22
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

International Commentary on Evidence

4

Vol. 6, No. 2, Article 5

could be cross-examined at trial.23 There was also no violation if the witness was
unavailable and the defendant had examined or cross-examined the witness when the
prior testimony was given.24 Later the Court began to address other kinds of hearsay
statements, holding that there was no confrontation violation if the out-of-court
statement used by the prosecution was a co-conspirator statement25 and no violation
if the out-of-court statement was an excited utterance.26
Even the 1980 opinion of Justice Blackmun in Roberts was consistent in its
result with what he described as the Court's practice up to that time of developing
confrontation doctrine in "the common-law tradition, . . . building on past decisions,
drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions."27 Justice
Blackmun devoted much of his Roberts opinion to describing the specific facts of the
case and explaining why the Court's precedent in California v. Green allowed the
prosecution to use the preliminary hearing testimony of the missing witness.28 His
explanation relied on the examination of the witness by defense counsel at the
preliminary hearing as sufficient to provide confrontation. Justice Blackmun
explicitly said that confrontation analysis did not depend on the inherent reliability or
unreliability of the prior testimony that was offered by the prosecution against the
defendant.29
Why then did Justice Scalia dramatically reject the reliability test of Roberts
in his Crawford opinion? The foundation for the reliability test did not come from
the holding of Roberts, but rather from Justice Blackmun's brief discussion of a
"general approach" to confrontation doctrine that he derived from the Court's
decisions.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he
is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.30
Justice Blackmun did not rely on his own general theory to explain the outcome in
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
Id. at 70-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 66.
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Roberts. Therefore Justice Blackmun’s Roberts opinion did not explain which
hearsay exceptions were firmly rooted and did not describe how to identify a
particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.
No Supreme Court decision fully adopted the general theory described in
Roberts. Both Justice Powell in Inadi31 and Chief Justice Rehnquist in White32
narrowed the application of Roberts by limiting its language about unavailability to a
case involving prior testimony. Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked the Roberts
language about firmly rooted exceptions in discussing co-conspirator statements in
Bourjaily33 and excited utterances in White,34 but neither opinion provided a test for
determining which exceptions might be firmly rooted. Justice Brennan in Lee35 and
Justice O'Connor in Wright36 discussed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
but each case concluded that the evidence was not admissible so neither opinion had
to define adequate guarantees of trustworthiness.
The strongest effort to build confrontation doctrine on Roberts was made by
Justice Stevens in Lilly.37 The vote to reverse Lilly's conviction was unanimous, but
only three other Justices joined the explanation Justice Stevens based on Roberts.38
Four other opinions provided different explanations.39 As a result, the Supreme
Court ended the twentieth century with a body of confrontation opinions that
addressed particular facts. The opinions had variously used, narrowed, or ignored the
language about reliability from Roberts, but the Justices had not found a consensus
on an overall theory of confrontation. That meant that trial and appellate courts had
to rule on situations the Supreme Court had not yet addressed and had to apply the
language of the Court’s opinions to facts the Justices may not have had in mind.
II. Crawford and The Evolution of the Testimonial Interpretation
Crawford v. Washington40 announced a new interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause to organize confrontation doctrine. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
discussed English legal history from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, colonial
31

United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-94 (1986).
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992).
33
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987).
34
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-36 note 8 (1992).
35
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543-46 (1986).
36
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816-23 (1990).
37
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
38
Id. at 120 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.).
39
Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. (Thomas, J., concurring);
id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring in the judgment). See generally
Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 Syr.
L. Rev. 87, 93-103 (2003).
40
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
32
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history, the debates over ratification of the United States Constitution, and early state
court experience.41 From these sources he concluded that the Clause was directed at
the use of ex parte out-of-court examinations as evidence against the defendant.42
Justice Scalia described such statements as “testimonial;” he offered three slightly
different definitions of a "testimonial" statement but did not state which was most
accurate.43 He identified a statement to a police officer during interrogation as
testimonial under any definition, without providing a definition of "interrogation"
because the facts of Crawford involved structured police questioning that was an
interrogation under any conceivable definition.44 Justice Scalia also concluded that
the original meaning of the Clause required excluding any testimonial statement if
the declarant did not appear as a witness at trial, unless the declarant was unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.45
Justice Scalia described the testimonial interpretation as necessary to correct
two problems with the Court's prior confrontation doctrine based on Roberts: the test
under Roberts was too broad because it applied to all out-of-court statements, and its
effect was too narrow because it allowed the prosecution to use a testimonial
statement as long as the trial court found it was reliable.46 Justice Scalia did note that
the Court itself had not been led very far astray by Roberts.47 However, some
appellate courts were routinely allowing prosecutors to use accomplice confessions,
grand jury testimony, and accomplice plea allocutions upon a finding that the hearsay
was reliable. Justice Scalia concluded that the reliability standard had not provided
meaningful protection because the tests for reliability that had been developed by the
appellate courts were amorphous, subjective, and unpredictable.48
Crawford made clear that a critical issue would be the scope of the definition
of a testimonial statement. At the core of the various definitions quoted by Justice
Scalia were prior testimony, affidavits, and depositions; each was a situation in which
the declarant was providing evidence under oath.49 The facts of Crawford itself
established that custodial interrogation by the police would produce a testimonial
statement. For some other statements the exact scope of the testimonial category was
left unclear. For example, Crawford quoted both a definition that depended on the
expectation of the declarant that a statement would be used prosecutorially and a
definition that depended on the reasonable belief of an objective observer that the
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 43-50.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 53 n. 4.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 51-52.
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statement would be available for trial.50
Crawford had an immediate impact, particularly in the cases in which the
prosecution had used a statement of an accomplice who did not appear at trial.
Appellate courts that had been relying on Roberts to allow the prosecution to use
grand jury testimony and plea allocutions without cross-examination changed course
after Crawford and found admission of that kind of evidence to be a confrontation
violation.51 Four years after Crawford this appears to have become a permanent
change.
The Supreme Court gave its first guidance on the scope of Crawford in
Washington v. Davis, when it addressed confrontation rules for a victim's statement
to law enforcement.52 In his Davis opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia put less
emphasis on the belief or expectation of either the declarant or the police officer
about any use of the statement; he put more emphasis on the purpose of the particular
interrogation. He described a statement as nontestimonial if "the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."53 He
described a statement as testimonial when there is no ongoing emergency and "the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution."54 Justice Scalia avoided the issue of whose
perspective mattered by describing the test as based on objective circumstances.
The result in Davis provided some illustrations of what the Court meant by an
ongoing emergency. In Davis the declarant made the challenged statements to a 911
operator just after her assailant hit her and ran out the door. Justice Scalia described
the statement in Davis as not testimonial because the declarant was seeking police
assistance for an ongoing emergency, when the declarant still faced a "bona fide
physical threat" because the assailant could return.55 In the companion case of
Hammon v. Indiana, the complainant made the statements to responding police
officers after the officers had separated the suspect from the complainant. Justice
Scalia described the statement in Hammon as testimonial because the emergency had
ended when the police officers secured the scene of the assault and took control of
the suspect.56 Justice Scalia rejected the state court’s position that "virtually any
'initial inquiries' at the crime scene" would produce nontestimonial statements.57 He
said that initial inquiries would often produce nontestimonial statements, but that the
50

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 98 (2nd Cir. 2008); United States v. Bruno, 383
F.3d 65, 78 (2nd Cir. 2004).
52
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
53
Id. at 822.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 826-27.
56
Id. at 829-30.
57
Id. at 832.
51
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response to an initial inquiry would be testimonial if the statements of a victim were
"neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately
to end a threatening situation."58 In addition, Justice Scalia rejected the argument by
Justice Thomas that the right of confrontation was limited to formal police
interrogation.59
The emphasis on the immediate threat to the declarant also meant that the
Davis definition of an emergency did not include the risk the suspect would commit
the same harm in the future. Justice Scalia and the other seven Justices in the
majority clearly did not accept the argument by Justice Thomas in his separate
opinion that the police response to the emergency could include determining whether
the suspect posed a continuing danger who might continue the assault after the police
left.60 A similar argument for a broader definition of an "emergency" had been made
by the State in its brief in Hammon61 and by the Solicitor General in an amicus
brief.62
Davis had an immediate impact on the decisions of other appellate courts.
Appellate courts have found that a statement is not testimonial if the victim was
reporting an ongoing crime.63 They have found that a statement is not testimonial if
it was made to the police before the officers were able to secure the scene.64 Other
appellate courts have found that a statement is testimonial because it reported a past
crime and there was no emergency still in progress.65
Even clear doctrinal statements in a Supreme Court opinion must still be
interpreted by other courts. Many appellate opinions compare the facts of a case with
the facts of Davis to determine if the statement was made while the declarant was
facing an immediate emergency,66 but some opinions rephrase the language of Davis.
For example, one court concluded that statements were nontestimonial because they
58

Id.
Id. at 830; see id. at 834, 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
60
Id. at 834, 840-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
61
Brief of Respondent State of Indiana at 10-11, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
62
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent State of Indiana at 10-11,
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
63
E.g., Key v. State, 657 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299
(Mass. 2008).
64
E.g., People v. McKinney, 2008 WL 2031350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Long v. United States, 940
A.2d 87 (D.C. 2007); State v. Shea, 2008 WL 3491404 (Vt. 2008).
65
E.g., Cuyuch v. State, 2008 WL 4286646 (Ga. 2008); Allen v. Commonwealth, 2008 WL 2484952
(Ky. 2008); State v. J.A., 949 A.2d 790 (N.J. 2008); Zapata v. State, 232 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. Ct. App.
2007).
66
E.g., Lewis v. United States, 938 A.2d 771 (D.C. 2007); State v. Martin, 885 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008); People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 2007); State v. Graves, 157 P.3d 295
(Ore. 2007).
59
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were made during a "continuing emergency situation," a phrase the court used to
allow the prosecution to use a statement that was made after the suspect was under
control in handcuffs.67 In other cases courts use the description of an "ongoing"
domestic or emergency situation as a sufficient label even though the facts in the
opinion suggest that the declarant was not facing a threat at the time.68 For example,
one court said there was an emergency when an officer asked a bystander for help
while seeking a car that had turned into a residential subdivision shortly after the
officer=s radar indicated the car was speeding.69 Other courts may discuss whether
there was an emergency when the statement was made, but suggest as well that a
statement is nontestimonial as long as it is a response to "unstructured
interrogation."70
Some appellate courts also have used a broad interpretation of what it means
to resolve an emergency. For example, one court described assessing the scene and
resolving the emergency as including police efforts "to get information from the
crime victim, calm her down, and relay information to other officers to apprehend a
potentially dangerous suspect . . . to protect the public."71 Another court described a
statement as nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the police was
determining whether the perpetrator had been apprehended and the emergency
situation ended.72 These standards could extend the scope of an emergency well
beyond any resemblance to the facts of Davis, but so far the Court has not reviewed
whether these courts are properly extrapolating from Davis to new facts not
considered in Davis.
Crawford left another issue undecided: whether the Confrontation Clause
imposes any limits on the prosecution use of a nontestimonial statement. Justice
Scalia said in Crawford that testimonial hearsay was at least the primary object of the
Clause.73 He left open two possible rules for nontestimonial hearsay by suggesting
that such hearsay might still be governed by Roberts or that it might not be subject to
the Confrontation Clause at all.74 Justice Scalia was more direct in Davis, describing
testimonial hearsay as both the core and the perimeter of the coverage of the
Confrontation Clause.75 The Court finally made a definite statement about
67

State v. Buckenberger, 984 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
E.g., State v. Bonvillain, 2008 WL 2064978 (La. Ct. App. 2008); People v. Thompson, 2007 WL
2141416 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
69
Segel v. State, 2008 WL 4140268 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
70
E.g., People v. Osorio, 81 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
71
State v. Koslowski, 2007 WL 1719930 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). See also State v. Riley, 2007 WL
625898 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
72
People v. Romero, 187 P.3d 56, 81 (Cal. 2008).
73
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004).
74
Id. at 68.
75
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006).
68
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confrontation limits on a nontestimonial statement in 2007 in Whorton v. Bockting, a
case in which there was no nontestimonial statement.76 Nevertheless, in order to
address whether Crawford was retroactive, Justice Alito had to examine how
Crawford differed from Roberts. In that discussion he stated that under Crawford
"the Confrontation Clause has no application to [nontestimonial] statements . . ."77
That statement appears to explicitly confirm the suggestions in Crawford and Davis
that there might be no confrontation limits on a nontestimonial statement.
The confirmation in Bockting that there is no confrontation limit on
prosecution use of a nontestimonial statement appears to make the definition of a
testimonial statement an all-or-nothing issue. Rejecting any room for flexibility in
confrontation doctrine means that every new issue will test the Court's commitment
to the testimonial interpretation.
III. Forfeiture of the Right of Confrontation
The Supreme Court addressed forfeiture of the right of confrontation in 2008 in Giles
v. California.78 By that time the Court had signaled twice that a forfeiture rule was
part of confrontation doctrine. In Crawford, Justice Scalia had described "the rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)" as part of confrontation doctrine.79 In
Davis he provided a similar endorsement, but he did not try to define a standard for
finding forfeiture.80
The primary issue that divided the Court in Giles was the standard for finding
forfeiture. The defendant in Giles was charged with murdering his girlfriend; he
testified the shooting was self-defense. At trial, the prosecution introduced
statements the victim had made to a police officer who responded to an earlier
domestic violence call. The State conceded the statements were testimonial, but the
California courts held that the defendant had forfeited his confrontation objection by
killing the declarant. Justice Scalia started his analysis from the proposition in
Crawford that any confrontation exception had to be recognized at the time of the
founding.81 He surveyed the historical evidence and concluded that the forfeiture
exception applied only when the defendant's conduct was designed to make the
declarant unavailable.82 He further described the standard as requiring purpose83 or

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

127 S. Ct. 1173.
Id. at 1183.
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682.
Id. at 2683.
Id.
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intent;84 causing the declarant to be absent would not suffice if the defendant did not
do so to keep the declarant from testifying at trial.85
Justice Scalia’s opinion was supported in full by only Chief Justice Roberts.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that intentionally committing a
wrongful act should suffice to forfeit confrontation rights if the likely consequence
was that the declarant could not testify.86 Justice Breyer was supported by only
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy. The reasoning of the other Justices complicates
the task of interpreting Giles. Justice Scalia drew two more votes for vacating the
California judgment from Justice Thomas and Justice Alito; both said they agreed
with Justice Scalia's conclusions about forfeiture but would not have reached that
issue if California had argued that the statement was not testimonial.87 Justice Scalia
drew two additional votes to vacate the California judgment from Justice Souter and
Justice Ginsburg. Justice Souter said in his concurring opinion that he was not
persuaded by Justice Scalia's examination of the historical record but agreed with his
conclusion on the grounds of logic and policy.88
The opinions in Giles also provided three views on how a prosecutor in a
domestic violence case could prove that the defendant had the purpose to prevent the
declarant from testifying. Justice Scalia stated that the evidence of the defendant's
purpose could include the facts about the abusive relationship of the defendant and
declarant; he did not state that those facts would be sufficient.89 Justice Souter
suggested the requisite purpose or intent could be inferred in any classic abusive
relationship.90 Justice Breyer argued that intentional misconduct should suffice for
forfeiture if the defendant should have known that it would prevent the declarant
from testifying.91 He also suggested that Justice Scalia's approval for using evidence
from an abusive relationship would allow courts to find purpose from evidence of
intent in a domestic violence case.92 The distinctions among the three positions may
become blurred as appellate courts translate Giles into practical rules for trial courts.
After Giles, some courts have rejected forfeiture arguments where the evidence did
not show why the defendant acted,93 so Justice Scalia's insistence that there must be
evidence of the defendant's purpose may prompt prosecutors to present some
84
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Id. at 2695, 2705 (Breyer, Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Id. at 2694 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
89
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693.
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Id. at 2694, 2695 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring)
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Id. at 2698.
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Id. at 2708.
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evidence about the specific relationship so that judges are not forced to rely
exclusively on stereotypes.
The topic that is particularly of interest for the future development of
confrontation doctrine is the way the Justices divided themselves into at least three
groups with differing views on how strictly the Court should be bound by historical
practice when it addresses a new confrontation issue. Justice Scalia continued to be
the strongest advocate of closely following history; he repeated the statement from
Crawford that the Sixth Amendment did not allow any "open-ended exceptions" to
the right of confrontation.94 He rejected Justice Breyer's dissent as a "thinly veiled
invitation to overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the
regime of Ohio v. Roberts, . . . under which the Court would create the exceptions
that it thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee,
regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood."95
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion presented the greatest contrast to Justice
Scalia's reliance on history, even though Justice Breyer said it was "important to
recognize the relevant history" and he agreed with Justice Scalia that an exception for
forfeiture was established at the time of the founding.96 Justice Breyer's argument for
a broader forfeiture rule went beyond the common law history by relying as well on
basic purposes and objectives of the rule, similar equitable principles, an interest in
avoiding evidence rules that are difficult to apply in practice, and an interest in
avoiding incongruous or anomalous confrontation rules. He argued that lowering the
confrontation barrier would allow the States to be more flexible in regulating the
admission of hearsay "where the need is significant and where alternative safeguards
of reliability exist."97
Justice Souter created a middle position between Justice Scalia and Justice
Breyer by joining all of Justice Scalia's opinion except for Part II-D-2, the section in
which Justice Scalia suggested that Justice Breyer wanted to abandon Crawford and
go back to Roberts.98 Justice Souter did not endorse Justice Scalia's reliance on the
historical record alone because he found there were too few cases to answer the
particular question in Giles.99 Justice Souter relied instead on his conclusion that
Justice Breyer's version of forfeiture was based on near circularity in reasoning that
would in practice lead back to the reliability interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause that had been rejected in Crawford.100 Justice Souter's willingness to look
94

Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692, quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 54.
Id. at 2691.
96
Id. at 2695-96 (Breyer, Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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Id. at 2700.
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Id. at 2694 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part).
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beyond the historical record might resemble Justice Breyer's argument for adding
policy to history, but Justice Souter supported Justice Scalia's result in Giles; Justice
Scalia did not comment on Justice Souter's explanation.
Justice Thomas presented a fourth position that cuts across the other three
rather than being located along the same axis.101 Although he concurred with Justice
Scalia's opinion and did not question the importance of allowing only historically
recognized exceptions, the approach of Justice Thomas could align him with Justice
Breyer in a case with different facts. The argument of Justice Thomas that informal
police questioning does not produce a testimonial statement is based on an
interpretation of the historical evidence that would leave informal statements to be
regulated by state evidence rules. For informal statements, that would sometimes
produce the same result as Justice Breyer's argument for adopting an easier standard
for forfeiture that would leave more statements subject only to state evidence rules.
Justice Alito's brief concurrence raising a similar question about the scope of the
testimonial category suggests that Justice Thomas may have gained a new ally for his
position.102
The publication of these different views suggests that the Justices were
looking ahead in Giles. They may have been looking ahead already when it was
argued. At oral argument, Justice Breyer was asking whether the Court had to
incorporate every detail of the common law into confrontation doctrine when Justice
Scalia interjected that the question had been answered in Crawford, and that
Crawford was "[a] case from which [Justice Breyer] dissented."103 It took a few
more exchanges before Justice Breyer could correct that misstatement by declaring:
"I joined Crawford, and Justice Scalia would like to kick me off the boat, which I'm
rapidly leaving in any event, but the -- (Laughter.)"104 The Giles opinions do not
identify any specific cases the Justices might have been anticipating, but there are at
least two candidates.
One confrontation issue the Justices may have had in mind in deciding Giles
is whether there are any limits on the prosecution use of forensic test results without a
witness. The Supreme Court had already granted the petition for certiorari in
Melendez-Diaz on March 17, 2008, a month before Giles was argued on April 22.105
A second confrontation issue the Justices may have had in mind is prosecution use of
hearsay statements of children in child abuse cases and sexual abuse cases. Two
amicus briefs in Giles specifically presented arguments for admitting such statements

101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
Transcript of Oral Argument 11, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
Id. at 13.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (Mar 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
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that ranged far beyond the issue of forfeiture.106 Prior to announcing Giles the
Supreme Court had recently denied petitions for certiorari in at least three child sex
abuse cases.107 The Court had also recently denied another petition for certiorari in a
murder case involving a hearsay statement of a three-year old child in which the state
court had concluded that the child’s statement was testimonial.108
IV. The Next Issue: Experts and Certificates
The Supreme Court will address a new confrontation issue in November when it
hears Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.109 In this case, the defendant was arrested for
selling cocaine by detectives acting on a tip. At his trial, the prosecution evidence
included nineteen baggies containing a white powder. Instead of having an analyst
testify about the contents of the baggies, the prosecution presented a drug analysis
certificate that stated the baggies contained cocaine. The trial court overruled
defendant's confrontation objection and admitted the certificate. In defendant's
appeal from his conviction, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected defendant's
confrontation objection in an unpublished memorandum:
In Commonwealth v. Verde, [444 Mass. 279 (2005)], the court held
that certificates of drug analysis did not deny a defendant the right of
confrontation and were, therefore, not subject to the holding in
Crawford v. Washington, . . . . We see no merit to the defendant's
simple assertions that Verde is contrary to Crawford . . .110
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied review of Melendez-Diaz
without an opinion,111 so the authoritative statement of Massachusetts law on a drug
test certificate is still the opinion in Verde. In Verde, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that state decisions from 1923 and 1969 that had rejected a
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Brief of the National Association to Prevent Sexual Abuse of Children's National Child Protection
Training Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678
(2008); Brief of the National Association of Counsel for Children and the American Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children in Support of Respondent, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678
(2008).
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Krasky v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1223 (Feb. 19, 2008); Bentley v. Ohio, 128 S. Ct. 1655 (Mar. 17,
2008); Muttart v. Ohio, 128 S. Ct. 2473 (May 19, 2008).
108
Ohio v. Siler, 128 S. Ct. 1709 (Mar. 24, 2008).
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Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct.) (unpublished opinion
available at 2007 WL 2189152); rev. denied, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007); cert. granted, 128 S.Ct.
1647 (Mar 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
110
2007 WL 2189152 at *4 note 3.
111
874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007).
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confrontation objection to certificates of analysis were still valid after Crawford.112
The Massachusetts court relied on four main reasons. First, the court explained that
Crawford had recognized the continued validity of hearsay exceptions that were
well-established at the framing, and asserted that in Crawford "the Court suggested in
dictum that a business or official record would not be subject to its holding as this
exception was well established in 1791."113 Second, the Massachusetts court
concluded that a certificate should be considered a public record because it was
neither discretionary nor based on opinion and stated the results of a scientific test.114
Third, the court described the certificate as only prima facie evidence that a defendant
may rebut.115 Fourth, the Massachusetts court stated that a certificate was not like an
ex parte examination that Crawford had said was the primary reason for the
Confrontation Clause.116
The divisions among the Justices that were apparent in Giles may appear
again when the Supreme Court decides Melendez-Diaz. There is even less chance in
that case than in Giles that the Court will find clear guidance from history. The state
of chemistry as a science in 1791 means there will be no precedent from the time of
the framing specifically addressing the admissibility of an analyst's certificate of the
chemical composition of a substance. Hearsay exceptions for business records and
public records were still in an early stage of evolution; the records that were admitted
under the hearsay exceptions were not like a certificate from an analyst who has
tested contraband. The sparse historical record means that neither side can show that
similar certificates were excluded or admitted, but that kind of reliance on history
does not explain how the Court should decide the case.
Other state supreme courts and federal appellate courts have added arguments
to the debate since the Massachusetts court concluded in Verde that a drug analysis
certificate is not testimonial. The scope of the debate now extends beyond drug test
certificates to include similar certificates reporting blood tests in drunken driving
cases and certificates reporting DNA testing of an item related to a criminal
prosecution. The courts that concluded that the prosecution cannot use a certificate
by itself as proof of the test results have relied on the language and policy of
Crawford.117 Crawford provided three different definitions of a testimonial
statement.118 In two of the definitions an affidavit was listed as an example. In the
112
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State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 308-10 (Minn. 2006); State v. Johnson, 982 So. 2d 672, 677-81
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third definition a testimonial statement was one that objectively was made for use at a
later trial. Under all three definitions the certificate in Melendez-Diaz would be a
testimonial statement..
Recent appellate opinions have provided four additional arguments why
Crawford does not bar the prosecution from using a test certificate without testimony
from the analyst. Some courts distinguish Crawford with the argument that a lab test
is neutral and not intended to incriminate or accuse.119 These courts stress that the
analyst tests an object without knowing anything about the suspect or the rest of the
case, and that the analysis may also exonerate a suspect. However, this argument
often appears to equate the purpose of the test with the purpose of the certificate; it
appears to lose its force if they are viewed separately. Even if the testing is objective
and neutral, the purpose of the certificate is to provide an affidavit the prosecution
can use to prove its case as a substitute for live testimony.
A second argument for distinguishing Crawford is that an analyst's certificate
does not resemble an ex parte examination.120 Of course, it does not resemble the
custodial interrogation in Crawford or even the noncustodial interrogation in Davis
or Hammon, but this argument appears to depend on a very cursory comparison. A
police officer may not question the analyst in the same way as the officer would
question a complainant or a witness to a crime, but there is still a question from the
police to the analyst about the amount and composition of suspected contraband. The
analyst knows from experience what information to include in the certificate.
Crawford did not define interrogation because a recorded statement in response to
structured police questioning was clearly within any conceivable definition.121
Justice Scalia said nothing in Crawford about the length of the interrogation,
especially where the declarant knows only one fact. However, there may be other
views on the Court. The suggestion of Justice Thomas in Giles that only '"a
formalized dialogue'" could produce a testimonial statement might lead him to
conclude that the stylized questioning of a lab request means that the certificate is not
a testimonial statement.122
A third argument for allowing the prosecution to use the certificate of an
analyst who does not testify is that Davis excludes any contemporaneous statement
from the testimonial category.123 This argument describes the certificate as a record
119

E.g., People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007), pet. for cert. filed (U.S., No. 07-7770, Nov.
14, 2007); State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 12-14 (N.H., 2007), pet. for cert. filed (U.S., No. 07-7577,
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n. 4 (2008).
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Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (Thomas, J. concurring).
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of what the analyst is observing about the contraband at the time of the test. It
depends on parsing the Davis test into its component parts and assuming that one
part—the contemporaneous nature of the statement—is sufficient to make the
certificate nontestimonial. This argument eliminates the other parts of the Davis test,
such as the emergency and the declarant's fearful cry for help. In some opinions, this
rationale includes an argument that the machine used to test a substance is essentially
the source of the certificate and that there is no confrontation violation because a
machine cannot be cross-examined.124
The final argument for allowing the prosecution to use an analyst's certificate
is that requiring the analyst to testify in every drug trial would be too burdensome.
The State's brief in Melendez-Diaz described the potential burden by citing statistics
about millions of drug cases every year, tens of thousands of felony drug trials every
year, and backlogs of testing requests in over one hundred thousand drug cases.125 In
addition, the state contended that most defendants do not really intend to
cross-examine the analyst, and that those who do cross-examine rarely accomplish
anything.126 Amicus briefs supported that position at greater length.127 The State’s
brief in Melendez-Diaz suggested that the defendant’s right to compel the analyst to
attend should be an adequate alternative to confrontation.128 This final argument for
avoiding the application of Crawford depends so much on an assumption that test
certificates are reliable that it might succeed only if the Court overrules or retreats
from Crawford’s rejection of reliability. That seems unlikely; even in Crawford the
Court maintained its record of never overruling any prior confrontation decision. At
the same time, the potential burden of requiring analysts to appear at trial may lead
some Justices to ask if there is a compromise position on test certificates that is still
consistent with Crawford's interpretation of the historical evidence.
The effect of Melendez-Diaz on other confrontation questions will depend on
the outcome, the reasoning in the opinion, how the opinion defines a testimonial
statement, how strictly the opinion adheres to history, and the extent to which it
explicitly considers the practical effect of any rule. Other cases the Court has
recently declined to review or that are still pending on the Court's docket illustrate
v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d at 753-54.
E.g., Washington, 498 F.3d at 231.
125
Brief of Respondent Commonwealth of Massachusetts 59-62, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (No. 07-591, 2008).
126
Id. at 60-61.
127
Brief of the States of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 23-28, MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (No. 07-591, 2008); Brief of Amici Curiae The
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some of the questions that are sure to arise after Melendez-Diaz. The list includes
drug cases in which a witness did testify about the test results, but the witness was
not the analyst who tested the drugs.129 It includes similar cases where the witness at
trial was not the analyst who tested the blood sample in a prosecution for driving
under the influence130 or the analyst who tested the DNA sample that identified the
defendant.131 The Court's docket also includes a case in which the appellate court
concluded that a test certificate was testimonial, but still allowed the prosecution to
use a test certificate because the defendant had not complied with a state law that
permitted the defendant to file a timely demand that the prosecution produce the
analyst at trial.132 There is a pending case where the appellate court rejected a
confrontation objection to the documents the prosecution used to prove that the
equipment used by the analyst was properly calibrated.133 Other cases on the Court's
docket that might be affected by Melendez-Diaz include a case in which the
testimony of a coroner was based on the autopsy notes of an unavailable doctor.134
Justice Scalia provided relatively straightforward rules in both Davis and
Giles, continuing the common-law approach to confrontation doctrine the Court has
most often used. If that trend continues, the Court will seek an uncomplicated test to
resolve Melendez-Diaz, even if the test may not resolve every question raised by
other cases on the docket. The Justices may be able to decide Melendez-Diaz without
the need to reconcile their differing positions on whether to consider policy as well as
historical practice. If the Justices do revisit Crawford's reliance on history, they will
find a rich store of academic commentary on the history of the Confrontation Clause
from the last decade that refutes Justice Harlan's well-known lament that "the
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment."135
129
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V. Looking Back and Ahead
State and federal courts have adapted to Crawford without major problems on many
confrontation topics, in large part because Crawford did not reverse any Supreme
Court confrontation decision and left intact almost all of the specific answers the
Court had previously provided. There were no pre-Crawford opinions on
confrontation issues in domestic abuse cases, but the recent focus on domestic abuse
prosecutions meant that the Court would have been asked eventually to address the
issue. Crawford probably sped up the process by giving new prominence to
confrontation doctrine that encouraged both prosecutors and defense counsel to try
new methods and to advance new arguments. The same effect probably explains
Melendez-Diaz and the large number of cases on the Court's docket that involve test
results and expert testimony based on hearsay. Will the Court be able to take a break
after Melendez-Diaz, or are there other major confrontation questions?
One topic that is appearing on the Supreme Court docket is confrontation
limits on hearsay statements of children in child abuse and child sexual abuse cases.
In 1989, in Idaho v. Wright, the Court reversed a conviction for lewd conduct with a
minor that was based in part on statements a 2 1/2 year old child made to a
pediatrician.136 Idaho argued that the child's statements were admissible under the
state residual hearsay exception; it argued that there was no confrontation violation
because the content of the statement had particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.137 The majority opinion by Justice O'Connor described the
pediatrician's examination without stating whether its purpose was treatment or
prosecution or whether the child made her statements privately or to someone acting
for the authorities.138 Wright concluded that the prosecution could not show
guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Roberts test by corroborating the content
of the statement, and that the facts did not establish enough other guarantees.139
In 1992, in White v. Illinois, the Court affirmed a conviction for sexual assault
that was based in part on statements the four-year old victim made to a nurse and
doctor. The statements were admitted under the state's medical examination hearsay
exception; the Supreme Court limited the grant of certiorari to the confrontation
question and assumed that the challenged statements fit within the hearsay exceptions
used by the state courts. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that
there was no confrontation violation because the medical examination exception was
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
J.L. & Policy 333-904 (2007).
136
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
137
Id. at 819.
138
Id.. at 809
139
Id. at 820-25.
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In Crawford, Justice Scalia described the Court's prior confrontation cases as
generally faithful to the testimonial interpretation;140 he did not mention Wright when
he summarized those prior cases even though he had joined Justice O'Connor's
opinion.141 In Crawford, Justice Scalia suggested that White's holding that allowed
the prosecution to use a statement to the police officer might not be consistent with
the testimonial interpretation, but he said nothing about White's analysis of a
statement during a medical examination.142 That silence left undecided the question
of whether every statement to a medical professional would be nontestimonial under
the new test adopted in Crawford. Justice Scalia stated in Giles that “statements to
physicians in the course of receiving treatment” are nontestimonial, but that
announcement also leaves some unanswered questions.
The split among appellate courts on whether statements by abused children to
medical personnel are testimonial has not been addressed by the Supreme Court. The
Court denied two recent petitions for certiorari from defendants. One case sought
review of the holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court that statements for medical
treatment were not testimonial; the interview of the child at a Children's Resource
Center had been arranged by the police and a county family services worker.143 A
similar case sought review of an Ohio Supreme Court case in which the police and
the government were apparently not involved in arranging the original interview that
was introduced at trial.144 The Court also denied a recent petition for certiorari in a
case that reached the opposite result. In that case the Iowa Supreme Court held that
statements were testimonial even though they were for medical treatment. The police
and a state human services worker had arranged the proffered interview of a child at a
Child Protection Center.145 The Court denied the petition in another case at the start
of the term in October.146 There are also many other appellate opinions on each side
of the dispute about the confrontation limits on prosecution use of a child’s
statements. Every judge and lawyer in such cases will undoubtedly read
Melendez-Diaz closely for any restatement, revision, or extension of Crawford.
A second issue that might be affected by what Melendez-Diaz may say about
confrontation doctrine is whether an indirect statement to the police can be
testimonial. Some of the questions the courts will face are illustrated by a recent case
in which a suicide note addressed to the author's parents accused the defendant of
conspiracy to commit murder. The suicide note also said that the author was sending
140
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the proof to the police. The prosecution evidence included the suicide note and the
contents of a briefcase the author of the suicide note had told his brother to look for
under the author’s bed if anything ever happened to the author. The Michigan courts
held that the suicide note was admissible and rejected the defendant's confrontation
objection.147 In a subsequent habeas action, the United States District Court had first
to resolve some complex issues about retroactivity and the standard of review. The
federal court then concluded that the suicide note was testimonial under Crawford
and that the state court erred in admitting the note.148
The federal court evaluated the suicide note under the three definitions of a
testimonial statement that were quoted in Crawford.149 The suicide note was not a
formalized statement, but the content provides strong evidence that either the author
or an objective witness would have expected that the prosecution would use the
suicide note as evidence. The report of the United States Magistrate Judge had
described the suicide note as "more consciously designed to provide incriminating
evidence" than any hearsay, apart from a formalized testimonial statement such as an
affidavit or deposition.150 However, the federal court did not mention the possibility
that the suicide note might be nontestimonial because it was addressed to the author's
parents and not directly to the police. Each of the statements in Crawford, Davis, and
Giles, was made to law enforcement. Law enforcement would not typically be
involved in the statements the Court has described as nontestimonial, such as
“business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy” and “[s]tatements to
friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in
the course of receiving treatment.”151 Perhaps the rationale or language the Court
uses in deciding Melendez-Diaz will provide further guidance on whether a
nominally private accusation can be a testimonial statement.
Conclusion
A decade ago, it might have seemed that confrontation doctrine was becoming so tied
to the hearsay rule that it served no independent function. Crawford made the
Confrontation Clause important again in its own right for prosecutors, defense
counsel, and judges. One question rarely mentioned is whether the Confrontation
Clause requires action from other branches of government as well. The adoption of
the Confrontation Clause, as well as other parts of the Bill of Rights, was a
commitment to a particular kind of federal criminal procedure. The incorporation
147
148
149
150
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doctrine extended the obligation to state criminal procedure. The criminal procedure
required by the Bill of Rights can appear expensive, particularly if the reasons it is
required are discounted. In a case like Melendez-Diaz the additional cost of requiring
the analyst to testify becomes more apparent. The briefs in Melendez-Diaz and the
appellate opinions in similar cases that discuss costs and burdens assume that the
current systems for testing and the presently available technology are all that is
possible. Must the courts limit the cost of criminal procedure to the budget they can
expect, or does the Confrontation Clause also impose an obligation on the legislature
and executive to develop and fund a law enforcement system that allows the courts to
follow constitutionally required procedure?

http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol6/iss2/art5

